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Abstract
Platform firm in the gig-economy are disrupting work as a social practice, production systems and
recasting capital-labour relations. This qualitative study examines worker agency in the Australian
food-delivery sector; a segment where platforms actively intermediate both product and labour
markets. Within this sector, worker agency poses a potential challenge to platform-organisations;
however this study reveals how these platforms’ work organisation and market regulation con-
strain agency potential. Shaped by the work’s spatio-temporal features, organisational fixes and
institutional context, it is shown how food-delivery workers, transiently attached to the labour
market, predominantly engage in ‘entrepreneurial agency’ – a low-level agency expression aimed
at materially improving individual conditions and aligning with, rather than challenging, platforms’
business models.
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Introduction
Work in the digitally enabled gig-economy has unique spatio-temporalities due to its ‘on
demand’ nature – often requiring short turnarounds between the offer and performance of
work. Gig-work, despite great variety in type and location (Howcroft and Bergvall-
Ka˚reborn, 2018), has shared characteristics. This includes the work organisation used by
work platforms (henceforth platforms); these modern-day labour intermediaries offer
short-term, one-off jobs (‘gigs’) to workers who themselves provide some of the means of
production (e.g. a car or bicycle) and are commonly remunerated on the basis of piece rates
(Stewart and Stanford, 2017). Gig-work is facilitated through platforms’ digital ecosystems
which are underpinned by matching-technology (Howcroft and Bergvall-Ka˚reborn, 2018;
Peticca-Harris et al., 2018; Stewart and Stanford, 2017), with algorithmic management often
used to exercise varied levels of control over task allocation and performance (Cherry, 2016;
Rosenblat, 2019). The gig-economy has expanded across high- (Goods et al., 2019) and low-
wage economies (Ford and Honan, 2019), reshaping industries as diverse as
photography and transportation. The gig-economy’s growth can be viewed as a neoliberal-
isation of work (Zwick, 2018), with work increasingly governed by market rather than social
regulation (Peck, 1996).
This paper, invoking labour geography, investigates whether workers can fashion favour-
able geographies to create ‘labour’s spatial fix’, that is, the ‘active mak[ing] of the geography
of capitalism . . . [to] facilitate their social reproduction and hence survival’ (Herod, 1997:
15). The idea of labour’s spatial fix, and how agency might be deployed in pursuit of it,
remains under-theorised and under-empiricised in informal and low paid work (Strauss,
2020). Based on a qualitative case study including interviews with workers engaged by
two on-demand food-delivery platforms operational in Australian cities, we show how
the work organisation of these platforms enables and constrains particular forms of
agency within these services and how workers exercise agency in response to these
arrangements.
Platforms’ business models represent a reshaping of capitalism and work within it
(Srnicek, 2017b; Veen et al., 2019). As a distinct form of capital, platforms have benefited
from a large influx of surplus capital into the technology sector (Srnicek, 2017a), often
through the speculative activities of venture capitalists. Using technology to create digital
marketplaces, platforms use technology to blur distinctions between employment, indepen-
dent contracting and enterprise. Effectively, gig-work is a novel extension of non-standard
work, in particular, temporary staffing work facilitated by labour market intermediaries.
Although platforms portray themselves as passive intermediaries between workers, end-
users and other parties this underplays the frequently active role they play in shaping eco-
nomic landscapes and the social relations which exist within them (Rosenblat, 2019). Food-
delivery platforms, for instance, are in the business of making markets, coordinating het-
erogeneous actors including customers, restaurants and workers to allow for the purchase of
delivered meals (Richardson, 2019). Platforms, however, differ from temporary staffing
firms in how they make markets as platforms intermediate both product and labour markets
through their digital infrastructures. Mirroring the historical expansion of temporary staff-
ing (Peck et al., 2005), platforms are simultaneously creating and shaping the markets they
intermediate, acting as ‘active intermediaries’ (Attoh et al., 2019; Rosenblat, 2019).
Garnering much scrutiny within economic geography in the 2000s (Wills, 2009), labour
market intermediaries sell labour effort to clients by creating triangular employment rela-
tionships (see Figure 1). Clients can thus access (for a price) a scalable workforce while
avoiding the (ongoing) costs and risks of direct employment (Coe et al., 2007). Similar to
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platforms (Peticca-Harris et al., 2018), labour market intermediaries employ a rent-seeking
business model, accumulating by extracting a portion of workers’ incomes while
providing flexibility for end-users (Coe et al., 2007). Workers in these temporary staffing
arrangements find comparative labour market advantage in their willingness to accept lower
incomes, placing downward pressure on intermediated and non-intermediated labour
markets (Coe et al., 2009).
Where temporary staffing firms typically engage workers as employees (Coe et al., 2009)
and operate within existing labour regulations, platforms’ business models ‘[leap] ahead of
regulations and workers’ (Srnicek, 2017a: 257). Most platforms rely on contractual arrange-
ments with workers to avoid employment-related costs and shift economic risks onto work-
ers (Cherry, 2016). In Australia, workers can be engaged either as employees, eligible for
labour law protections including access to the ‘national employment standards’, or inde-
pendent contractors, where the relationship is characterised as between businesses and as
such these minimum standards do not apply. The state applies a multi-factor test to deter-
mine the appropriateness of classifications (Stewart and Stanford, 2017). The contractor
classification, however, constrains platforms’ ability to directly control labour (Veen et al.,
2019). Platforms, therefore, rely on inter-worker competition (Peck, 1996) and deploy ‘pro-
cess’ fixes (Silver, 2003) to secure labour effort and to shape supply and demand in the
labour market. Platforms’ pursuit of independent contracting relationships can be viewed as
a response to the social regulation of employment, where they engage deliberate organisa-
tional strategies to either outpace regulations or create regulatory vacuums (Srnicek, 2017b).
Platforms proclaim that independent contracting relationships are fundamental to their
business models (e.g. Deliveroo, 2018; Uber, 2018) and reflect the nature of labour-
capital relationship – the latter is, however, disputed in legal proceedings around the
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world (Meijerink and Keegan, 2019). While increasing scholarly attention has been paid to
platforms’ attempts to control labour, make markets and engage workers as contractors,
limited attention has been paid to labour’s exercise of agency in response.
Within capitalist socio-economic relations, including the gig-economy, the relationship
between labour agency and production systems is dialectical, with labour regimes reflecting
capital’s responses to prior expressions of labour agency (Cumbers et al., 2008). To date,
others have prioritised capital’s role in shaping the gig-economy (e.g. Srnicek, 2017b: 1),
which means that labour’s actions and choices in shaping the gig-economy have been under-
considered. To remedy this, we turn to labour geography. Labour geography is a project
within critical geography which outlines how workers’ actions are both produced by and
productive of economic space, with workers’ territorial and relational position within
economic space shaping how production occurs and the unevenness of economic space
(Herod, 1997; Pattenden, 2016). Fundamental to workers’ ability to shape space is the
choices that workers make and how they express agency (Strauss, 2020). Responding to
calls within labour geography for empirical studies that advance agency understanding
to ‘the maximum extent’ (Castree, 2007: 858), this paper contributes to a literature that
considers labour agency in a way that is sensitive to workers’ position in particular labour
regimes (e.g. Padmanabhan, 2012; Warren, 2019).
By advancing understandings of worker agency, informed by labour geography (Coe and
Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Peck, 2018), we contribute to analyses of labour’s responses to the gig-
economy and how these responses, in turn, shape both labour and capital’s spatial fixes.
Building on Agar and B€ohm’s (2018) notion of the socio-spatial fix, the circumstance where
capital and labour’s spatial desires coincide, we consider how individual workers, shaped by
their labour market context, engage in agency. Based on qualitative interviews with food-
delivery workers operating in Australia, we unveil how food-delivery platforms constrain
labour agency as well as seek to reshape understandings of agency itself. Revealing how
these workers, in the Australian context, mainly engage in individualised expressions of
agency which reinforce, rather than test, capital’s accumulation, we challenge existing
notions of labour and capital’s spatial fixes being in opposition to each other (Strauss,
2020). The paper makes three contributions. First, we extend explorations of how labour
agency is expressed on the basis of the characteristics workers bring to the labour market
(building on Carswell and De Neve, 2013). Second, we introduce a new categorisation of
‘entrepreneurial’ agency and in doing so explore the contradictory relationships between the
worker, other workers and platforms within app-based food-delivery services, highlighting
how labour agency in this segment of the gig-economy is sustaining platform-capitalism
(Srnicek, 2017b). Third, we contribute to emerging scholarship which emphasises the impor-
tance of time and timing of worker agency (Coe, 2013).
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we set out the context of
app-based food-delivery work in the Australian gig-economy. We then position this work in
relation to labour agency scholarship, followed by our research methods. Subsequently, we
consider why the independent contractor status and labour market positionality of
workers is significant in the Australian context, before discussing the wider importance
of these findings. Finally, we delineate the limitations of the study and set out avenues
for future research.
Context of app-based delivery work in Australia
The Australian labour market has, since the turn of the 20th century, been characterised by
state intervention and relatively high protections for labour, supported by trade
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protectionism, restricted immigration and an extensive welfare system (Macintyre and Isaac,
2004). Neoliberal reforms since the 1990s increasingly deregulated and decentralised the
industrial relations system reducing institutional protections for organised labour and
encouraging individual employment relationships (Cooper and Ellem, 2008). Coupled
with increasingly market-regulated migration regimes, including temporary migration
(van den Broek et al., 2019), there has been a profound shift in labour market institutions,
contributing to a fragmentation of work while increasing the prominence of market-
mechanisms in rulemaking.
‘On demand’ platform-work, including food-delivery work, has been a growing labour
market development in Australia; a national labour market survey found that 13.1% of
respondents had previously worked, or were working, through a digital platform
(McDonald et al., 2019). The platforms considered in this study, Deliveroo and Uber
Eats, have experienced significant growth since market entry, with Deliveroo reporting
6500 active couriers (Deliveroo, 2019) and Uber around 80,000 partners across its rideshar-
ing and food-delivery services (Uber, 2018). In Australia food-delivery platforms classify
workers as independent contractors, thereby circumventing labour protections (Goods et
al., 2019). This preference for contractor rather than employment relationships reflect ele-
ments of the organisational fix (Silver, 2003) and allows platforms to sidestep direct employ-
ment (De Stefano, 2016).
Food-delivery platforms act as ‘double’ market makers, seeking to match restaurants that
sell food (and drinks) with consumers while also facilitating the transport of such goods
from restaurant to consumer. Platforms are effectively ‘job creators’ who seek to increase
their returns, as did temporary staffing firms before them, by ‘transforming markets, rather
than simply capturing extant markets’ (Peck et al., 2005: 11). This represents an extension of
traditional labour market intermediation into product and labour markets. Double market
making can involve triangular relations, such as in ride-hailing, where the product is the
labour. In app-based food-delivery, however, it is a quadrangular relationship, as depicted
in Figure 1. To accumulate, food-delivery platforms need to simultaneously make and
coordinate (a) a product market, intermediating between consumers and restaurants; and
(b) a labour market, matching labour supply with the demand generated by product mar-
kets. The nature of the product market makes the work ‘stubbornly local’ (Coe et al., 2007:
506) and subject to hyper-local availability of workers (Peck and Theodore, 2001) as the
quality of the product degrades as soon as it is produced (i.e. hot food gets cold, cold food
gets warm). The novelty of work organisation in app-based food-delivery arises from the
organisational and technological fixes used. These fixes place the workforce outside the
realms of any organisation, providing temporal and spatial flexibility by allowing workers
to decide the times and locations at which they await their ‘pieces’. Yet, concurrently, labour
is tightly controlled and managed through the digital ecosystems and algorithmic manage-
ment (Peticca-Harris et al., 2018: Veen et al., 2019; Rosenblat, 2019).
Coordinating quadrangular relationships between restaurants, consumers, workers and
platforms, in a time- and space-sensitive manner, means that app-based food-delivery serv-
ices are subject to specific spatio-temporal challenges. For instance, workers do not neces-
sarily deliver for the same restaurant nor, for that matter, platform. To overcome such
challenges, and sustain capital accumulation, platforms must therefore create a spatial fix
(Harvey, 1982) which facilitates provision of a quickly degrading product while ensuring
actors are able to make two markets (Richardson, 2019).
Consequently, these services are offered in areas with spatio-temporal proximity between
supply and demand in both product and labour markets. Once the product is ordered,
platforms need to solicit potential labour power from labour markets. Through
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technological fixes, behavioural nudging and reliance on market pressures, food-delivery
platforms are able to concoct a scalable workforce that can meet consumer demand
(Rosenblat, 2019; Srnicek, 2017b). In order to receive deliveries, workers make themselves
‘available’ through mobile phone applications created and curated by the platforms – sig-
nalling their willingness to sell their labour. Platforms then utilise algorithms as a manage-
rial tool to allocate deliveries (‘pieces’), which workers can accept or reject (Veen et al.,
2019). Workers’ contractor classification ensures that platforms do not compensate workers
for their idle time. While in theory workers have the ability to restrict their availability or
exit the industry if the idle time becomes too great, Australia’s labour market is character-
ised by persistent under- and unemployment, growing precarity and increasing availability
of temporary migrant labour (Oliver and Yu, 2019; van den Broek et al., 2019), meaning
such actions are less likely. It is within this context that we explore worker agency.
Conceptualising labour agency
Labour agency, defined as ‘both the intention and practice of taking action for one’s own
self-interests and the interests of others’ (Rogaly, 2009: 1975), is expressed in response to
production relations under capitalism. Labour agency simultaneously shapes how labour is
integrated into production processes and economic space itself (Herod, 2001). The concept
of labour agency is fundamental to labour geography, as it is both the deliberate choices of
workers, and their effects, which allow workers to shape the geographies of capitalism
(Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, 2011; Herod, 1997). While frequently invoked, labour
agency remains under-empiricised and under-theorised within labour geography (Castree,
2007; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Strauss, 2020). The concept, however, has seen greater
attention within sociology and industrial relations (Burawoy, 1979; Scott, 1987).
Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2011: 257) capture the imprecision of its use, stating agency
‘can be informal or formal, individual or collective, spontaneous or goal directed, sporadic
or sustained, and it can operate on different scales’.
Labour agency can be conceptualised in different ways, including classifications based on
intended outcomes (Katz, 2004), institutional constraints (Cumbers et al., 2016), spatiality
(Herod, 2001) and relations to social reproduction (Padmanabhan, 2012). We use Katz’s
(2004) classification of resistance, resilience and reworking as a starting point for categorising
labour agency, which can be expressed in the spheres of production and social reproduction
(Warren, 2019). Resistance, the least prevalent form, describes attempts by labour to tran-
scend capitalist social relations across both spheres (Cumbers et al., 2016). Reworking
involves attempts to improve workers’ conditions, both at and outside of work, while
operating within existing social relations (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011). Resilience, the
lowest level of agency, consists of small acts of coping under often adverse socio-
economic circumstances (Warren, 2019). These acts are necessary in order for workers
to sustain themselves; however, these acts can also reinforce the trajectory of capitalist
socio-spatial relations which created these adverse circumstances in the first place (Katz,
2004; Scott, 1987; Warren, 2019).
Within labour geography, labour agency is fundamental to the active role labour plays in
reshaping the landscapes of capitalism (Herod, 1997). Individual and collective expressions
of labour agency shape the geography of capitalism through the actions and interactions of
workers, households, segments of capital, other workers, civil society and governments
(Coe, 2013; Strauss, 2020). This occurs because particular workers, or groups of workers,
pursue their own spatial visions that can intersect, sometimes for sustained periods, with the
interests of capital and to the detriment of other workers (Agar and B€ohm, 2018; Harvey
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and Williams, 1995). Despite an expansion in research on labour agency, labour’s agency
potential, globally, has diminished through the neoliberalisation of labour regimes, leading
to ‘worsening conditions and relative rewards for the majority of workers worldwide’ (Coe,
2013: 279). Historically, (collective) agency was frequently considered through the actions of
trade unions (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011), although there are some notable exceptions (e.g.
Rogaly, 2009). In the context of declining union density and influence, union actions now
represent an increasingly narrow tranche of agency. Agency, therefore, needs to be consid-
ered more widely.
Moving beyond the actions of trade unions, workers’ agency potential is understood to
be influenced by ‘horizontal’ factors, including gender, age, caste, migrant status and social
network in making and constraining agency (Carswell and De Neve, 2013) and the inter-
action between workers’ productive and reproductive obligations (Dutta, 2016). There have
also been recent calls for understanding the difference between the agency potential of
deliberate acts and that of the routine daily activities of workers, as both have the capacity
to shape economic geography (Agar and B€ohm, 2018; Jordhus-Lier et al., 2018). Research
on labour agency has expanded to consider the geographies of non-unionised workers, the
influence of horizontal factors across and within various locations, scales and industries, and
the many intersections, contradictions and conflicts which emerge as a result (Dutta, 2016;
Hastings, 2016; Pattenden, 2016). Nevertheless, the emergence of the gig-economy has
the potential to further diminish workers’ agency potential and from a labour geography
perspective remains under-researched.
Platforms’ active intermediation of work in app-based food-delivery, coupled with work-
ers’ contractor classification, conceals the ‘employer’ (or ‘job creator’) almost totally from
the focus of labour agency, as illustrated in Figure 1. Platforms’ ability to simultaneously
intermediate two markets means gig-work can be understood as a novel form of ‘internal
globalisation’, where capital deploys strategies including outsourcing, lowering labour costs,
deregulation of labour markets and allowing particular forms of migrant labour to diminish
workers’ agency potential in place (Cumbers et al., 2016). The ‘gigification of work’ invites
questions about how the organisation of work in the gig-economy shapes workers’ agency
potential. Platforms’ extension of labour market intermediation limits workers’ agency
potential by fragmenting workers from each other, reducing the practicality of trade
unions and by creating a disjunction between workers and the ‘job creator’ (Coe and
Jordhus-Lier, 2011). This contractor classification, and its endorsement by the Australian
state (Pallage v Raiser Pacific Pty Ltd, 2018), reflects the state’s ability to reinforce power
relationships at work (Bocking, 2018) and curtail workers’ ability to assert agency either
through enforcement of employee entitlements or finding other ways to challenge capital.
The agency potential of gig-economy workers is shaped by their labour market position,
especially where labour markets are regulated by market forces rather than social processes
(Peck, 1996). This occurs because the effects of labour agency are differentiated, depending
on who those workers are, their relationships with other actors and how much influence they
carry (Cumbers et al., 2008). One ‘horizontal’ factor particularly relevant to this case is
workers’ migrant status (Carswell and De Neve, 2013). Migrants shape both agency poten-
tial and exercise by influencing both the supply of labour and the social regulation of work
in place (Lier, 2007). Different categories of migrants (e.g. based on country of origin, skill
set and migration status) have different positionalities in labour markets. Migrants, how-
ever, are generally placed at a disadvantage to ‘local’ workers (Datta et al., 2007; Waite,
2009). Temporary residency status further disadvantages migrants by inhibiting the ability
to develop ongoing collective structures (Rogaly, 2009), placing these individuals at a
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further disadvantage and increasing their exposure to the ‘whip’ of the market (Burawoy,
1983; Datta et al., 2007).
Finally, temporal factors are critical to understanding expressions of agency in gig-work.
Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) explain that time shapes agency potential in two ways: the
temporality of gains and the timing of agency. The latter considers when, and in which
spatio-temporal circumstances, expressions of agency occur. Expressions of labour agency
both in the past, and in different places, shape future expressions of agency (Barratt and
Ellem, 2019). The former considers the term, or intended term, of employment. Workers in
precarious jobs, or who are unlikely to remain in a workplace, are less likely to share in the
rewards of successful expressions of reworking or resistance (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011).
This creates an incentive for ‘short-term’ workers to accept current arrangements. What,
however, does the gig-economy as an extension of work intermediation, a new form of
internal globalisation and a departure from socially protected work mean for individualised
workers and how they express agency, and what are the consequences of these expressions
for economic space?
Methodology
This study used a qualitative case study design (Yin, 2013) to examine app-based
food-delivery work for two major platforms, Uber Eats and Deliveroo, in the Australian
gig-economy. The lack of empirical studies examining worker experiences within the
gig-economy, coupled with this paper’s focus on worker subjectivities, justifies the research’s
exploratory approach. Data was collected in accordance with a university ethics protocol
between January and July 2017. Workers were interviewed via street intercepts in two major
cities, Perth and Melbourne, either at the work site while waiting for jobs or at a later date at
the worker’s convenience. In addition, workers were recruited via online participant recruit-
ment sampling using internet forums and snowball sampling techniques. Supplementing this
interview data were the authors’ in situ observations as they visited different neighbour-
hoods ‘serviced’ by the platforms at different times of day and different days of the week.
Interview data was coded thematically, considering the exercise of agency by workers, the
spatio-temporality of the work, exit triggers and ‘fit’ of gig-work into workers’ wider lives.
A total of 58 workers were interviewed over 42 interviews. In addition, the research
team had multiple informal interactions with representatives from both platforms.
Twenty-four per cent of workers engaged in ‘multi-apping’, where they worked simulta-
neously for both platforms, 49% worked exclusively for Uber Eats; and 27% worked
exclusively for Deliveroo. The majority of workers (75%) rode bicycles, 20% used
motorised scooters and the remaining 5% delivered via car. The sample was majority
male (91%) and in Australia on a temporary basis (81%) including on international
student or working holiday visas.
The tensions and contradictions of worker agency in the gig-economy
Our examination of labour agency within the Australian app-based food-delivery sector
highlights two fundamental characteristics which constrain, shape and enable particular
forms of agency. First, platforms’ organisational and process fixes shape and constrain
the forms of agency available to workers, resulting in individual expressions of agency –
which we characterise as ‘entrepreneurial agency’ – which aligns individual workers, as
labour, with platforms while pitting workers against each other. Second, workers’ labour
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market positionality is shown to reinforce these constraints, further limiting workers’ agency
potential and sustaining this labour market arrangement.
The features of gig-work: Shaping worker agency
In the Australian app-based food-delivery sector, and similarly in other comparable labour
market contexts, gig-workers’ contractor status profoundly shapes their agency potential.
Contractors are self-employed, placed in market competition with each other, paid by the
‘piece’ and – distinct from other piecework arrangements – rely on the platforms, and indeed
the algorithms the platforms deploy, for the allocation of each piece of work, a function of
platforms’ dual market making role (Richardson, 2019). Contractors’ acts of resilience must
be conceptualised differently from those of an employee. For instance, where Burawoy
(1979) describes employees limiting their effort to improve their working life, food-
delivery contractors must find ways to generate income and sustain themselves by finding
better ways to be allocated, and then perform, ‘pieces’ of work. Critically, this economic
reality is reinforced by many workers’ self-conceptualisation shifting from a dependent
employee to ‘their own boss’ or a micro-entrepreneur (Interviews 1, 6, 9, 17, 23, 26, 29,
32, 39) – a normative conceptualisation that platforms reinforced. This characterisation was,
however, not universally accepted (Interviews 1, 31). Those who saw themselves as
micro-entrepreneurs attempted to maximise their income by adopting an ‘entrepreneurial’
agency, which reinforced platforms’ market making. Consequently, their expressions of
agency reflected those of entrepreneurs seeking capital accumulation rather than employees
seeking the redistribution of profit – reinforcing rather than challenging platforms’ contin-
ued accumulation.
One strand of ‘entrepreneurial’ agency centred on worker attempts to increase their
income by maximising ‘piece’ allocation. For example, ‘multi-apping’, working on multiple
platforms simultaneously (i.e. Deliveroo and Uber Eats) or being ‘logged in’ to a platform
simultaneously using multiple accounts. This limited, individual form of reworking
increased workers’ access to ‘pieces’, without materially challenging the platforms’ opera-
tions. Almost a quarter of interviewees engaged in multi-apping, while others expressed an
intention to (Interviews 2, 9, 16, 18, 23). Individual workers’ earnings may increase by multi-
apping, but this results in other workers missing out on these ‘pieces’. Multi-apping also
aligns with, and reinforces, the interests of the platforms. First, it provides platforms with
access to a larger workforce (partially resolving the labour supply issue), sustaining their
ability to make markets. Second, it gives credence to workers’ independent contractor clas-
sification by reducing workers’ dependency on any one platform, often a critical indicator of
employment in Australia (Stewart and Stanford, 2017).
Another ‘entrepreneurial’ expression of agency was workers’ willingness to invest in
upgrading their mode of transport, for example from bicycle to scooter (Interviews 2, 13,
16, 17, 35). Workers, by using a scooter or car, could work faster and for longer, enhancing
earning capacity. Asset upgrades are a form of resilience which sustains the platforms’
ability to make both markets. The upgrades increase the reliability and speed of deliveries,
expand the viable range between restaurants and customers and entice workers to provide
labour supply for longer periods of time. Workers, additionally, will seek a return on their
investment, an indirect self-pacification of labour. These findings contribute to an emerging
focus within labour agency scholarship (Warren, 2019) which departs from the traditional
focus on reworking and resistance, demonstrating how expressions of resilience need to be
carefully identified and understood as facilitators but equally inhibiters of higher-levels of
agency within the context of market regimes.
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Platforms must overcome the spatio-temporal challenge of ensuring that there are suffi-
cient workers across dispersed locations to meet demand. Platforms are rent-seekers and
want to seek the greatest rent from the consumer, while paying workers the minimum for
their labour effort. In practice, through the use of service fees, platforms charge workers for
market access, thereby extracting another rent. To achieve a reliable supply of labour,
platforms adopt a number of different labour strategies to ensure reliability of service
(Richardson, 2019). Deliveroo, for example, provides a small cohort of workers with
‘shifts’ that guarantee them payment for a certain number of deliveries (whether performed
or not) for specific times in locales of potential high demand. Uber Eats offers ‘boosts’,
where each delivery in a particular area at a particular time is paid at least 110% of the base
payment. The latter, however, does not guarantee the availability of ‘pieces’. For example,
workers were encouraged by Uber Eats to work on New Year’s Eve, but when little work
materialised one worker complained, ‘[workers] have wasted their evening. Instead of
doing something [social], they’re earning no money’ (Interview 9). ‘Shifts’ and ‘boosts’
were temporary inducements to enhance labour supply. One worker explained ‘there used
to be a lot of areas boost previously but not now’ (Interview 29). Platforms withdrew these
incentives when labour supply outstripped product market demand – illustrating that the
activation of labour effort in this segment of the gig-economy is partly realised through
market despotism.
‘Boosts’ are economic nudges used by Uber to influence worker behaviour (Rosenblat,
2019), which interviewees understood and responded to in various ways. While some viewed
them as an encouragement to work at particular places and times (Interview 1, 37, 38, 39),
many ‘entrepreneurially’ regarded them as an opportunity to increase earnings (Interviews
5, 7, 15, 26, 27). One form of resilience expressed by some workers was to ignore the boosts.
Two workers (Interviews 37, 41) ignored platforms’ attempts to interfere with other parts of
their lives. Others described the trade-off between working at locations and times that suited
them, forgoing potentially increased earnings (Interview 9). Workers were, however, con-
scious that boosts merely represented the ‘opportunity’ for additional earnings but that in
practice this was determined by actual consumer demand. To ensure reliability of service
platforms need to shape the labour market behaviour of sufficient (not all) workers to
outstrip product market demand.
In app-based delivery work, a critical area of agency is the choices workers made about
‘where’ and ‘when’ to wait to maximise job allocation (Interviews 12, 13, 26, 30) – under-
scoring the spatio-temporal sensitivities of the work. Locational choices were made based on
asymmetrical information, with workers knowing less about demand and supply than the
platforms, as highlighted in analyses of the nature of food-delivery markets more generally
(Richardson, 2019). Thus, the decision to make oneself available for work was based upon
multiple sources of information, including colleagues’ experiences (Interview 7), online
forums (Interview 31) and the imperfect information provided by platforms (Interview
21). The allocation of ‘pieces’ was shaped by spatial and temporal factors including location
(Interview 26), day of the week (Interviews 3, 4, 5), time of day (Interview 23) and other
exogenous factors such as weather (Interview 13). Workers explained, for instance, that
inclement weather increased product demand and reduced labour supply (Interview 3, 13,
17, 23, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32). Workers’ locational choices, while inefficient and based on
asymmetrical information, reflect individual workers expressing locational agency through
attempts to maximise their income and cope with these market relations. As workers’ com-
mute between locations is unpaid, most interviewees expressed a preference for remaining in
an area once they ‘logged in’ (Interview 5), only seeking better locations upon returning
from a delivery if no new orders had been received (Interviews 7, 21). Hence, agency
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expressions were the culmination of workers’ ‘entrepreneurial’ interpretation of different
work-related conditions and individual circumstances, meaning they remained uncertain
about how effective these expressions would be.
Workers’ ability to express agency in the labour process is actively constrained by the
technological fixes deployed by food-delivery platforms. Smartphone technology is used to
direct, surveil and monitor workers, shaping and constraining agency potential. Platforms
can monitor workers’ location in time and space (Interviews 6, 7, 32, 33) and through
customer ratings (Interviews 25, 27, 33, 37), reducing workers’ ability to express agency.
Nonetheless, workers engaged in resilience to make the work more bearable. One Deliveroo
rider, for instance, ‘jail broke’ his phone to manipulate his GPS location, allowing him to
appear closer to the ‘waiting zone’ and be allocated his next order (Interview 9). This indi-
vidual form of reworking enabled the individual to increase his earning by increased access
to work, yet this activity is to the detriment of other workers rather than the platforms, who
are still able to make markets.
The labour market positionality of ‘gig’ workers
The findings highlighted that workers’ labour market positionality and the relatively low
entry barriers to gig-work effectively curbed workers’ agency potential. Interviewees (5, 6, 9,
39, 24, 34, 41) explained that they had little market power and enjoyed few, or poor, labour
market alternatives, with other work frequently described as unviable or less desirable.
One worker described how ‘[t]he main disadvantage [of this work] is that you’re not paid
very much at all’ (Interview 31) and another, a migrant, exclaimed that ‘we are slaves in your
country’ (Interview 8). Exacerbating workers’ sense of precarity were experiences of labour
market discrimination and underemployment (Interviews 12, 27, 34, 36, 38, 39). Indeed, the
weakened labour market position, and lack of agency potential, led one worker to
consider participation in this research as an expression of agency due to the limited options
available to them:
I’m hoping [this] research would really expose certain sides of the industry. Most people do this
job because they don’t have many options in their life . . . no matter how quick you are – the pay
is going to be around minimum to below minimum wage . . . I hope they will answer these
interviews because it might reveal something. But most people do complain but they don’t
want to do anything about it (Interview 30).
This intersects with the activist tradition within labour geography where researchers are
generally sympathetic to the workers that they study (Castree, 2007).
A majority of interviewees were temporary, non-citizen migrants, a group prone to
occupy peripheral positions within labour markets (Datta et al., 2007). Interviewees (3, 4,
6, 12, 13, 17, 20, 24, 29, 30, 33) provided numerous accounts of how their visa status limited
their ability to access better jobs. Workers, who were frequently on international student or
working holiday visas, originated from countries including France, Brazil, Colombia,
Malaysia, India and Nigeria. Depending on the applicable visa, Australian law places con-
straints upon workers, for example limiting international students’ working rights to
40 hours per fortnight (Department of Home Affairs, 2019). This subsequently limits
workers’ ability to find jobs that match their skills, as employers ‘are not going to hire
someone who’s only going to be able to work part-time . . . for a few months’ (Interview 6).
This creates a division in the Australian labour market between those who have full work
rights and those who do not. The low entry barriers to gig-work help to explain the relatively
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high representation of migrant workers in the Australian gig-economy (McDonald et al.,
2019). In addition, some workers believed that their contractor classification allowed them
to work hours in excess of their visa restrictions. This was based on the legally untested
assumption that their payment by piece rather than hour abrogated their visa restrictions.
Workers’ transient attachment to the Australian labour market, and gig-work in partic-
ular, curbed their desire to express agency beyond individual expressions of resilience,
engaging only occasionally in reworking. Many interviewees (27 out of 58) explained that
they had no long-term commitment to food-delivery work. This, in turn, limited their appe-
tite for more radical forms of agency. The characteristics of gig-work suited their short-term
outlook, with interviewees detailing clear and proximate exit intentions including: the ability
to find a better job (Interviews 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 17, 24, 27, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42),
completion of studies (Interviews 25, 28, 29), expiration of visa (Interviews 3, 15) or other
personal reasons (Interviews 7, 20). Hence, individuals were unlikely to benefit from longer-
term, institutionalised gains that could be achieved through collective expressions of rework-
ing or resistance. Workers’ limited temporal attachment to this form of work is a significant
point overlooked by studies that consider worker resistance in the gig-economy (Tassinari
and Maccarrone, 2020). Moreover, platforms have the capacity to terminate workers with-
out cause or even target those who exhibit forms of agency as the contractor classification
places them outside the employment law protections against unfair dismissal.
Limited and uncertain income meant that workers found additional ways to sustain
themselves and recharge their labour power. In particular, those who relied on food-
delivery as their primary source of income described how their ultra-precarious position
in the labour market was dependent on their conduct in the sphere of reproduction
(Baglioni, 2017). Some explained how they relied on the earnings of other members of
the household (Interviews 17, 38), while one participant described how he used a food
charity to feed himself (Interview 15). Others sustained their reproduction by eating food
provided by restaurants, often a gesture of goodwill or when orders were cancelled. In the
extreme, workers reported that colleagues, rather than themselves, stole food from custom-
ers (Interviews 15, 41). All these actions, focused on the sphere of reproduction (Warren,
2019), helped workers to recharge their labour power and allowed for their continuance in
gig-work. The above expressions of agency do not pose a fundamental threat to the business
model of platforms and can be managed through existing organisational fixes, such as the
deactivation of accounts.
Interviewees reported coping with gig-work by contextualising work within their life
circumstances. Their temporary status meant downgrading their labour market expecta-
tions, with one worker explaining ‘I’m happy, really happy doing this job . . . [but] I would
probably not do it in France, because I think I can do much better’ (Interview 7). Further,
the limited period in which workers foresaw their engagement in this type of work was an
important element of resilience, which allowed workers to accept or justify the poor working
conditions in the short term. The willingness to accept these ‘temporary’ conditions for
individual workers resulted in those same conditions enduring for those workers who
replace them, effectively enabling the platforms access to a workforce in sufficient numbers
to continue to act as a market maker.
Discussion
The digitally enabled gig-economy represents a hyper-precarious extension of prior forms of
work-intermediation. Food-delivery platforms like Uber and Deliveroo engage workers as
contractors rather than employees – discursively recasting workers’ identities away from
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employment to one of enterprise; portraying workers as the salespersons of their own
labour. Extending the analysis of worker agency beyond successful (collective) worker
actions (Castree, 2007), this case study advances understandings of labour agency by showing
how workers’ acceptance of an entrepreneurial mindset changes both the forms of agency they
deploy and who this advantages. Platforms’ recasting of workers as contractors fundamen-
tally changes the regulation of work and evidences platforms’ active intermediation of mar-
kets, as it helps them solve the broader challenge of double market making. Platforms’
solutions centre upon constraining workers’ agency potential and engaging workers with
limited labour market power, extending the scope for market regulation of work.
Workers, especially those who accepted the discourse of micro-entrepreneurship,
expressed ‘entrepreneurial’ forms of agency, aligning their personal interests, as labour,
with capital in market competition and in opposition to the interests of other workers –
that is, over class-based interests. These gig-workers’ responses reflect Siemiatycki’s claim
(2012: 470) that ‘in some circumstances, labour plays its part in shaping the geography of
capitalism not by challenging capital but by complying with its imperatives’. The work
arrangements adopted in this segment of the gig-economy have allowed platforms organ-
isations, as a distinct quantum within contemporary capitalism (Srnicek, 2017b), to reshape
the nature of capital-labour relations by engaging in a technologically enabled work inter-
mediation which shifts economic work-related risk onto workers, thereby reinforcing, and
even driving, precarity. In turn, this undermines workers’ ability to sustain institutionalised
gains and carve out decent jobs from the landscapes of capitalism.
Although platforms portray themselves as neutral ‘market places’, where labour can be
bought by end-users requiring a specific service, app-based food-delivery platforms actively
facilitate and coordinate the quadrangular relationship between end-users, restaurants,
labour and the platform itself. Moreover, rather than passive intermediation, platforms
play a critical role in the creation and regulation of both product and labour markets
(i.e. ‘double market’ makers) and, in contrast to traditional labour market intermediation,
can be viewed as active ‘job creators’. While staffing agencies also frequently transform
rather than capture extant labour markets (Peck et al., 2005), we contend that critical to
agency potential is food-delivery app-based platforms’ need to ensure the creation and
coordination of the product market (i.e. the offering of the delivery service). The platforms’
simultaneous activity across two markets creates particular spatio-temporalities that require
on-demand labour in particular places at particular times in order to be able to create and
extract value. Under these conditions of active market making and intermediation, the
organisational fix of classifying workers as independent contractors undermines agency
potential by legislatively placing labour outside of any organisational realms. It subjects
workers to the whip of the market and places them in direct competition with each other –
realising labour activation through market despotism (Burawoy, 1983). The technological
fix, controlling labour through dehumanised management and rating systems, exacerbates
these issues. We find the gig-economy to be creating new norms around workplace behav-
iour, including the ‘entrepreneurial’ mindset and the extension of workplace competition
between workers. In short, changes in the ‘labour geography’ materially influence the ability
of workers to express agency to create labour’s spatial fix.
The nature of Australia’s labour market, with high levels of temporary migrant workers
and high un- and underemployment (Oliver and Yu, 2019), allows app-based platforms to
deploy organisational and technological fixes which constrain and reorient worker agency.
Collective agency is strongly discouraged, while ‘entrepreneurial’ expressions of individual
agency are encouraged, allowing workers to materially improve their conditions in the
spheres of production and reproduction – at least in the short term. In this context, workers
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predominantly engage in individual low-level forms of resilience aimed at materially improv-
ing individual earning capacity, which aligns and reinforces rather than challenges the
interests of capital. These acts are also often directly opposed to the interests of other
couriers, as attempts to increase individual earnings simultaneously prevents capital from
having to raise the price of each piece and denies other workers access to those pieces,
effectively reinforcing a negative-sum-game for workers. The stubbornly local nature of
the work requires capital to fragment a workforce, which is situated contemporaneously
in place, through labour market intermediation, applying contractor status and generating
inter-worker competition. The bounded ability of app-based food-delivery workers to
express agency is perhaps unsurprising, especially given that temporary staffing workers
are already less likely than ‘regular’ workers to effectively express worker agency (Coe
and Jordhus-Lier, 2011), but raises a critical counterpoint to overly optimistic accounts
(e.g. Tassinari and Maccarrone, 2020) about how gig-workers, through collective agency
expressions, can pose a threat to platforms’ ability to accumulate.
The lack of appetite of app-based delivery workers to engage in expressions of agency
beyond individual resilience and the occasional reworking, underscores the need to consider
agency potential in relation to workers’ economic and social contextual circumstances and
their ‘horizontal’ characteristics (Carswell and De Neve, 2013). One particularly pertinent
horizontal factor shaping agency in the app-based food-delivery segment of the Australian
gig-economy was workers’ non-citizen status – with the majority of interviewees residing in
Australia on temporary visas, such as international student visas. Australia has the second
largest temporary migrant workforce in the world (OECD, 2019) whose vulnerability is
exacerbated by their visa conditions and places them in peripheral positions in the labour
market, with temporary migrant workers systemically subjected to exploitation including
underpayment, ‘wage theft’ and, in the extreme, bonded labour (Clibborn and Wright, 2018;
Wright and Clibborn, 2020). These workers’ frames of reference and expectations about
working conditions and entitlements are often shaped by comparison with labour market
conditions in their home countries, expectations about the host country and peer group
experiences. This reveals why, in Australia, temporary migrant workers frequently tolerate,
accept and even embrace working conditions below national minimum wages and standards
(Clibborn, 2018).
State action, or inaction, as well as broader institutional settings are also critical contex-
tual factors shaping the vulnerability of app-based ‘gig’-workers in Australia. The current
migration framework’s market governance, for example, creates additional barriers to
agency; for example, limiting workers’ capacity to engage in trade union membership and
activity (van den Broek et al., 2019). Moreover, although labour inspectorates – the Fair
Work Ombudsman in Australia – can initiate enforcement activities around app-based
‘gig’-work, complicating its task are platforms’ organisational fixes which commonly oper-
ate at the margins, rather than in clear breach, of existing regulations. The Fair Work
Ombudsman, as an organisation, further faces resource restraints and ‘structural challenges
to enforcing labour standards in the parts of the labour market where temporary migrants
are concentrated’ (Wright and Clibborn, 2020: 18).
The role of unions, as an institutional actor and traditional mechanism for collective
agency, are another pivotal factor explaining variegation in agency expressions across the
app-based ‘gig’-economy. In the United Kingdom, the Independent Workers’ Union of
Great Britain (IWGB), as a new union dedicated to enhancing the labour market position
and plight of low paid migrants has, to an extent, been orchestrating and coordinating
different forms of collective agency. Conversely, in the Australian context institutional leg-
acies and associated inter-union demarcations and disputes have so far fractured Australian
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unions’ capacity to effectively respond to the growth in these precarious jobs, with their
capacity further eroded by sustained government attacks on the union movement more
broadly (Cooper and Ellem, 2008; Wright and Clibborn, 2020). As a result, Australian
unions have predominantly focused on supporting individual app-based food-delivery
workers’ legal cases (Workplace Express, 2019) rather than mobilising and organising.
Without being definitive, we suggest the combination of these institutional and horizontal
factors explains the lack of collective agency in the Australian context.
Food-delivery workers’ agency potential is fundamentally shaped by their precarity
(Strauss, 2018), reflected in their desire to engage in more formal and socially protected
labour markets. Their temporary and non-citizen status, however, hindered their ability to
access state resources and social transfers. Precariousness is a differentiated phenomenon,
comprising differing causes and effects across space and time (Coe, 2013), yet it is useful to
describe individuals’ and families’ lived experience on the basis of their labour market
position (Waite, 2009). Critically, in app-based food-delivery work, this precariousness con-
strained workers’ agency potential to a level where their actions often reinforced the
power of platform-organisations and perpetuated their marginality within labour markets.
These workers earn income in a pocket of market-regulated employment relations within a
broader institutional context where work is socially protected.
The ability of food-delivery platforms in Australia to carve out a pocket of labour
market competition outside the realms of regulated employment protections brings
to the fore the continued importance of the institutional context and its implications
for labour agency. Operating in a high-wage country with strong employment
protections, app-based food-delivery platforms have, through their organisational fix,
produced intra-worker competition and individualisation which directly undermines
workers’ capacity and desire for collective expressions of agency. Platforms created
these labour regimes, which are sustained, in part, by regulatory inaction and
state institutions, which endorse ‘entrepreneurial’ forms of agency while discouraging
more ‘disruptive’ forms of agency (Bocking, 2018). This follows the neoliberal turn
that the Australian state has taken with respect to employment relations since the
1990s (Cooper and Ellem, 2008; Wright and Clibborn, 2020), creating a fertile
ground for the mushrooming of the gig-economy. Indeed, Australia’s receptiveness
to the gig-economy is underscored by the performance of platforms: in 2017
Uber made an AUD$4.4m profit in Australia despite global losses of AUD$6bn
(Bailey, 2018).
The findings of this paper are necessarily bound by the limitations of the research design,
including the exploration of gig-workers in one sector of the gig-economy in one location.
Further, by studying workers at a point in time in their workplace, we do not consider the
actions of workers who have already exited this gig-work, the ease of exit in food-delivery
exacerbating this blind spot. There is a need to go further, with more geographically focused
research on the territorial variegation in the various forms of gig-work, its regulation and
institutional responses to its emergence. Within labour agency, amid an expansion in frag-
mented and intermediated work, there is a need for deeper investigation into entrepreneurial
agency, and what the gigification of work does to labour–capital interactions over time,
across space and both inside and outside the ‘gigosphere’.
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